Ddi liquidating trust
Despite Judge Chang's clear statements on this matter, DDI's current Complaint and summary judgment filings do not acknowledge that Count I has been limited to trademark dilution. 224, at 16-19 (labeling Count I as "Restraint of Trade, Deceptive Business Practices and Tradename Dilution under Lanham Act"); PSOF, Dkt. The defendants did not overlook the court's 2011 ruling, however, and, accordingly, their summary judgment opening brief treats Count I as presenting a claim only for trademark dilution under § 43(c). DDI has not proceeded on this statutory basis...."). Dilution of a trademark's distinctiveness generally occurs when consumers are led to mistakenly associate the plaintiff's famous mark with the defendant's inferior product or service, or when a famous mark appears on different goods and services and therefore no longer serves as a unique identifier of the plaintiff's product or service. are so numerous as to deprive the mark of its distinctiveness and hence impact)...."). entices readers of his blogs to send him donations"); PSOAF, Dkt. And the single reference in Grabowski's 34-page expert report to "trademark value," unaccompanied by any discussion of that concept or any breakdown of damages estimated to be traceable to trademark dilution, is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on this question. Sullivan, 385 F.3d at 779 (affirming summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff "failed to present any evidence of actual dilution" on ITRPA and Lanham Act trademark dilution claims); Games Workshop Ltd. During discovery, DDI identified 85 allegedly defamatory statements that were published by one or more of the defendants. DDI asserts that all 85 statements are actionable both as defamation per se (Count V) and as defamation per quod (Count VI). The defendants seek summary judgment on both of DDI's defamation claims with respect to all 85 statements.
In its response, DDI clarifies for the first time that it is not claiming trademark dilution under § 43(c) of the Lanham Act, and that Count I is directed solely at false advertising under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Inexplicably, Defendants argue summary judgment is appropriate because DDI cannot prove the elements of a violation of [§ 43(c)].... causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark." 765 ILCS 1036/65(a). Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir.2000); see also Ill. 3, 1996) ("[Antidilution statutes] protect the trademark owner from the erosion of the distinctiveness and prestige of a trademark caused by the sale of other goods or services under the same name (for example, the use of `Tiffany & Co.' as the name of a hamburger stand, or simply a proliferation of borrowings that ... The inclusion of DDI's logo and name in Article A is evidence that the defendants used DDI's trademarks, but it does not demonstrate that their actions diluted those trademarks. Accordingly, summary judgment on Count II is appropriate because DDI has not sufficiently established that the defendants' use of DDI's logo and name has diluted those trademarks. 273-58 (identifying 51 defamatory statements); Second Supp. 294-1 (revising information about several previously identified statements and adding additional statements, for a total of 85 statements). 274, at 33-34 (stating that defendants' "numerous websites and other publications...subsumed in [the] per quod count"); Second Supp. 294-1, at 7-9 (indicating that all 85 statements identified as defamatory are alleged to be defamatory per se).
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes all genuinely disputed facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.
The facts in this background section, and the further details that will subsequently be introduced as needed, are primarily drawn from the undisputed (or not properly disputed) facts in the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements and responses.
June 30, 2015) (responses that claim "insufficient knowledge" or otherwise "neither admit nor deny" certain statements of facts are insufficient to create a genuine dispute). 273, at 12, ¶ 12; Third Amended Complaint (the "Complaint" or "TAC"), Dkt. DDI's business involves analyzing urine, blood, and other samples for health care practitioners.
The form reports the heavy metal levels in the patient's urine, lists "reference ranges" of typical heavy metal levels in non-provoked samples, and graphically classifies each of the patient's levels as "within reference range," "elevated," or "very elevated" based on those non-provoked reference ranges.
For this test, physicians submit urine samples to DDI which are either "provoked" or "non-provoked"; a provoked sample is one the physician collects after administering a "chelating agent," which temporarily increases the patient's excretion of heavy metals. 273, at 12-14, ¶¶ 12-14, 19, 23; see also DMSJ Mem., Dkt.